China’s middle class, surpassing 400 million individuals by 2025, constitutes a pivotal socioeconomic segment, marked by urban concentration, escalating incomes, and heightened educational levels. This group, encompassing households with annual earnings above 200,000 RMB (approximately $28,000 USD), operates within a framework of robust national pride intertwined with international ambitions. From the escalation of US-China geopolitical frictions in 2018 onward, Chinese state-controlled media outlets, including People’s Daily, Global Times, and China Central Television (CCTV), have systematically depicted the United States as a waning superpower, underscoring elements such as political fragmentation, socioeconomic disparities, and assertive foreign interventions. This anti-US framing, disseminated via digital platforms like Weibo and WeChat, aligns with the middle class’s appreciation for China’s international elevation. Nevertheless, a profound incongruity persists: numerous affluent families in this cohort allocate considerable resources toward facilitating their children’s engagement with American educational systems, indicating a concealed affinity for the prospects embodied in the American Dream—encompassing socioeconomic advancement, individual autonomy, and worldwide viability.
This article posits that, notwithstanding the prevalent anti-US rhetoric in Chinese public spheres, affluent Chinese families exhibit a potent, frequently unspoken, yearning for American cultural and economic assets via their educational decisions. These decisions encompass preliminary expenditures on private English instruction, frequently amounting to 30,000 RMB ($4,200) monthly or higher, and a marked inclination toward US higher education institutions relative to alternative global options. The examination relies on three core data categories: (1) patterns in international student enrollments, notably the continued influx of Chinese students to the US; (2) surveys and qualitative assessments of parental incentives; and (3) economic metrics pertaining to education expenditures, incorporating the clandestine sector for native English instructors. By amalgamating these resources, the article asserts that these families’ behaviors disclose a pragmatic longing for the American Dream, even within a national milieu that suppresses such inclinations. Furthermore, this analysis integrates a psychoanalytical lens, drawing on Freudian concepts of repression and ambivalence, to argue that the most vehement expressions of anti-Americanism often mask the deepest, most intimate cravings for what America represents. In this view, hatred serves as a defensive mechanism against inadmissible desires, where public denunciation conceals private admiration. The title, Who Wants to Be America, distills this duality, illuminating the gap between overt rhetoric and covert ambition.
To expand this argument, consider the broader implications of repression in collective psychology. Sigmund Freud’s theory of repression posits that unacceptable desires or impulses are banished from conscious awareness but persist in the unconscious, often manifesting in distorted forms such as aggression or denial. In the context of nationalism, this can translate to a societal level, where anti-US sentiment functions as a collective repression of envy or longing for American freedoms and prosperity. The more intense the public hatred, the stronger the underlying, repressed love—a dynamic observed in historical analyses of nationalism and imperialism. For Chinese affluent families, this manifests in their contradictory behaviors: vocal alignment with state narratives while privately pursuing American opportunities.
Anti-US Rhetoric in Chinese Public Discourse
Media and Social Media Narratives
Commencing with the 2018 US-China trade conflict, anti-American viewpoints have constituted a recurrent element in Chinese public communication. State-supervised media routinely disseminate critiques of US internal and external strategies. For instance, a 2024 Global Times piece characterized the US as confronting structural impediments, referencing political schisms and societal disturbances, whereas CCTV segments have accentuated concerns like metropolitan criminality and fiscal inequities. These depictions are bolstered on social media, where prominent figures portray the US as an adversary to China’s burgeoning international stature. A 2023 Pew Research Center poll revealed that 76% of Chinese adults maintain a negative perception of the US, with 54% attributing this to its alleged meddling in global matters.
This rhetoric is anchored in tangible frictions, such as US visa limitations on Chinese STEM scholars and penalties against entities like Huawei. For the middle class—comprising urban specialists, administrators, and business owners earning over 200,000 RMB—this narrative harmonizes with national esteem, propelled by China’s economic expansion and infrastructural feats. Overtly, many in this stratum articulate doubt or disapproval of the US, mirroring cultural expectations and authentic apprehensions regarding American directives.
Expanding on this, recent 2025 developments have intensified the rhetoric. In May 2025, the US State Department’s announcement to revoke visas for certain Chinese students affiliated with sensitive fields further fueled media portrayals of American hostility. Articles in Global Times framed this as evidence of US paranoia and decline, reinforcing a narrative that positions China as the ascending power. On Weibo, discussions often amplify these themes, with hashtags like #AmericanDecline gaining millions of views. This environment fosters a performative patriotism, where middle-class individuals may publicly endorse anti-US views to align with societal norms, even as their private actions diverge.
Public Sentiment vs. Private Behavior
Notwithstanding this overt narrative, the confidential conduct of affluent Chinese families implies an alternative outlook. Although they may conform to anti-US positions in communal or digital exchanges, their educational outlays signify a predilection for American prospects. This variance is especially pronounced among the upper-middle class, who emphasize international competitiveness and perceive US education as a conduit to attaining it.
From a psychoanalytical standpoint, this discrepancy can be interpreted through Freud’s concept of ambivalence—the simultaneous harboring of love and hate toward the same object. In Freudian terms, the public hatred of America may represent a reaction formation, where unacceptable desires (e.g., admiration for American individualism and opportunity) are inverted into their opposite: overt criticism. Freud himself exhibited anti-Americanism, which some analysts attribute to repressed vanity or envy of America’s vitality. Similarly, in contemporary China, the most strident anti-US voices among the middle class may stem from an intimate, secret craving for what they denounce. This repressed desire “returns” in disguised forms, such as the pursuit of US education, which allows families to vicariously access the forbidden allure without direct admission. Lacan, building on Freud, viewed anti-Americanism as ideological, masking a “rational kernel” of envy for American ego-ideals. Thus, the hatred is not mere rejection but a veil for inadmissible love.
Educational Investments as Evidence of Repressed Aspiration
Illegal Private English Tutoring: Scale, Scope, and Psychological Underpinnings
Private English tutoring represents a pervasive activity among affluent Chinese families, notably in metropolitan hubs such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. By 2025, projections indicate the English-language training sector in China will attain a valuation of $332.3 billion by 2029, with private tutoring comprising a substantial portion (Technavio, 2025). Notwithstanding the 2021 “double reduction” directive, which prohibited profit-oriented tutoring in fundamental subjects like English for school-aged youth, the appetite for individualized English education endures, transitioning to unofficial or subterranean channels.
Statistics reveal that 60–80% of affluent urban families (households with incomes >200,000 RMB/year) register their offspring in private English tutoring prior to elementary education. A 2024 inquiry determined that 70% of high-earning parents commence English curricula by kindergarten, frequently favoring native speakers to guarantee proficiency and cultural acclimation. Expenditures are considerable: conventional individualized sessions span 500–1,000 RMB ($70–$140) per hour, whereas comprehensive or rigorous regimens can aggregate 10,000–20,000 RMB ($1,400–$2,800) monthly. For the most prosperous families, engaging full-time native English educators—occasionally functioning illicitly on tourist or commercial visas—may incur 30,000 RMB ($4,200) monthly or greater, with certain arrangements reaching 50,000 RMB ($7,000) for bespoke setups. A 2023 Bloomberg assessment observed that the tutoring prohibition escalated clandestine charges by 2–3 fold, mirroring elevated demand amid wealthy demographics.
These disbursements are propelled by a tactical emphasis on English as a prerequisite for transnational education, especially in the US. Guardians regard fluency as indispensable for triumph in standardized assessments (e.g., SAT, TOEFL) and entry to premier establishments. The magnitude of this expenditure—frequently 20–30% of family revenue—highlights a protracted dedication to international prospects, with the US as the chief objective.
Psychoanalytically, this investment signifies the “return of the repressed.” The public repression of American admiration, enforced by nationalist discourse, reemerges in the private sphere as obsessive preparation for US integration. Families channel their inadmissible craving into “acceptable” educational pursuits, where English becomes a symbol of the desired American ego—confident, global, and free. This dynamic echoes Freud’s view that repressed desires manifest in symptoms or compulsions, here seen in the disproportionate spending on tutors as a sublimated form of love for America. The illegality of some tutoring arrangements adds a layer of secrecy, mirroring the inadmissibility of the underlying desire.
US Universities: Always the Preferred Destination Despite Declines
The inclination toward American education is apparent in international student enrollment patterns. For the 2024/2025 academic year, preliminary IIE data reported 329,541 Chinese students in the US, positioning China as the second-primary origin after India but the foremost non-Indian nationality. This constitutes roughly 30% of China’s 1 million outbound students, notwithstanding a 25% reduction from the 2019 apex of 370,000, attributable to geopolitical strains, escalating expenses, and post-pandemic adaptations.
However, 2025 data indicates further declines. US student visa issuances to Chinese nationals dropped 24% year-over-year in the first half of 2025, totaling just over 11,000, per ApplyBoard analysis. In May 2025, F-1 visa issuances for Chinese fell 15% (about 2,578 fewer students), amid visa revocations for those in sensitive fields. Overall, the US hosted nearly 1.3 million international students in September 2024, an all-time high, but projections for fall 2025 suggest 30–40% fewer new arrivals due to policies and perceptions. Despite this, China remains a top sender, with 277,398 students in 2023–2024.
In comparison, the UK accommodates about 150,000–160,000 Chinese students, exhibiting a 10% annual increment owing to abbreviated programs and advantageous visa protocols. Canada and Australia each harbor around 100,000–120,000 Chinese students, yet both confront 2025 enrollment restrictions, constraining expansion. Alternative locales, like Japan (~122,000 Chinese students) and Singapore, are ascending but deficient in the eminence of Western entities for affluent families. A 2024 HSBC poll ascertained that 27% of Chinese parents designate the US as their principal study locale, surpassing the UK (20%) and Australia (15%), with American universities esteemed for their scholastic standing and vocational prospects.
Parental motivation surveys bolster this bias. A 2023 University of Southern California examination of 3,000 Chinese alumni ascertained that 90% referenced “excellence in education” and “personal development opportunities” as rationales for selecting the US, substantially outweighing elements like migration or prestige. Likewise, a 2025 Global Admissions report observed that affluent families favor US establishments for their worldwide connections and employability, with 60–80% of high-income parents submitting to multiple US institutions. These selections mirror a conviction that American education proffers distinctive entry to cultural and economic assets, consonant with the ambitions of the American Dream.
Psychoanalytically, the persistence of US preference amid declining numbers and heightened rhetoric underscores ambivalence. Families “hate” US policies publicly (e.g., visa crackdowns) but crave its educational system intimately, repressing the conflict through rationalizations like “pragmatic choice.” This mirrors Freud’s observation that repressed desires fuel obsessive behaviors, here seen in the undeterred applications despite barriers.
Secretly in Love with America
Freudian Foundations: Repression, Ambivalence, and the Return of the Repressed
To deepen the analysis, consider the psychoanalytical proposition that those who hate America most are the ones who most intimately, secretly, and inadmissibly love and crave it. This draws from Sigmund Freud’s theories, where repression involves expelling unacceptable impulses from consciousness, only for them to resurface in altered guises. In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Freud argued that societal norms repress individual desires, leading to discontent and aggression. Applied to nationalism, anti-Americanism can be seen as a collective reaction formation, inverting desire into hatred to maintain psychic equilibrium.
Freud’s own anti-Americanism exemplifies this: he dismissed America as superficial, yet analysts suggest this masked envy of its energy or repressed “American vanity.” Lacan extended this, viewing anti-Americanism as ideological, concealing admiration for American subjectivity. In modern contexts, such as Brexit nationalism, repressed imperial desires return as xenophobia.
Collective Repression in Chinese Middle-Class Nationalism
In China, state-driven nationalism represses desires for Western (American) individualism, framing them as threats to collective harmony. The middle class, benefiting from China’s rise yet facing domestic pressures like job competition and censorship, may unconsciously crave American freedoms—expression, mobility, meritocracy. Public hatred (e.g., media critiques) defends against this, but the repressed returns in educational pursuits, where families project their desires onto children.
Surveys show mixed sentiments: While 76% view the US unfavorably, many admire its education and innovation. A 2021 Current Sociology study noted urban families treat US education as a “status hedge,” sublimating repressed aspirations. This ambivalence intensifies with policies: Visa revocations provoke hatred, yet applications persist, revealing the craving.
Evidence from Broader Psychoanalytic Literature
Psychoanalytic essays on anti-racism and DEI in America highlight how hatred masks envy or projection. Similarly, in China, anti-US rhetoric projects internal frustrations (e.g., inequality) onto America, while secretly coveting its solutions. The underground tutoring market symbolizes this secrecy—illicit actions for inadmissible goals.
Economic Commitment as Manifestation of Desire
The fiscal dedication to US education is extensive. In 2023, Chinese students added roughly $12 billion to the US economy via fees and expenditures, part of the $40 billion from all international students (IIE, 2024). Affluent families finance 80% sans scholarships, frequently exhausting reserves or incurring debts. US education costs—$50,000–$80,000 yearly—surpass the UK’s ($25,000–$40,000) or China’s domestic ($1,000–$5,000). This premium payment emphasizes the discerned worth of American prospects.
Preliminary investments in English tutoring further exemplify this pledge. The covert market for native educators, spurred by the 2021 prohibition, serves families prepared to disburse 30,000–50,000 RMB monthly for specialized guidance. This equates to 5–10 times the mean urban per capita earnings (~5,000 RMB/month), denoting a notable concession. A 2024 market evaluation approximated that private tutoring comprises 7% of family outlay and up to 45% of education disbursements for affluent households, with English predominant.
Psychoanalytically, this economic sacrifice is a compulsion driven by repressed desire. Freud noted that obsessions arise from unresolved conflicts; here, families’ disproportionate spending compensates for the inadmissible love, turning hatred into investment.
Persistent Craving
Although the US retains primacy, its advantage is contested. The UK has advanced, with a 2025 New Oriental Education poll showing 41% parental preference versus 30% for the US, due to reduced costs and steady policies. Geopolitical frictions, encompassing US visa curbs and discerned anti-Asian bias, have prompted a 9–10% application decline since 2019. Canada and Australia stay competitive, albeit with 2025 caps restricting expansion, while Japan and Singapore allure budget-aware families.
These transitions imply the US’s attraction, though robust, is utilitarian rather than unequivocal. Affluent families diversify submissions—24% target three or more nations, per a 2025 Beijing Overseas Study Service Association report—denoting a tactical methodology to global education. Nonetheless, the US’s scholastic repute and professional linkages sustain it as the favored option for those capable of affording it.
From a psychoanalytical angle, these challenges amplify the argument: Heightened barriers (e.g., visa drops) fuel public hatred, yet the craving endures, manifesting in alternative strategies like dual applications. This resilience underscores the depth of repressed desire—the more obstructed, the more intimately pursued.
Broader Implications: Nationalism, Globalization, and Psychic Conflict
Expanding further, this dynamic extends beyond education to broader globalization trends. Chinese middle-class consumption of American media, brands (e.g., Apple, Hollywood), and lifestyles—despite censorship—reveals similar repression. A 2025 study on nationalism posits that imperialism and capitalism repress desires, returning as aggressive nationalism. In China, this manifests as “wolf warrior” diplomacy alongside private emigration or investment in US assets.
Psychoanalytically, this collective ambivalence mirrors Freud’s war analysis: Enjoyment in aggression stems from repressed ties. For families, “hating” America publicly allows secret love, resolving internal conflict. Proposals like admitting 600,000 Chinese students highlight potential reconciliation, reducing repression.
Conclusion
The substantiation is unequivocal: Notwithstanding anti-US rhetoric in Chinese media and communal discourse, affluent families expend profusely on American education, from nascent English tutoring to US university submissions. These endeavors mirror a concealed ambition for the American Dream—a vista of prospect, mobility, and global sway that endures despite overt doubt. The investment magnitude—30,000 RMB monthly for instructors, $50,000–$80,000 yearly for tuition—accentuates absolute and undisputed faith in American cultural and economic worth. While the UK and others ascend, the US persists as the apex selection for future seekers.
Integrating psychoanalysis, this reveals a deeper truth: Those hating America most harbor the most intimate, secret love. Repression transforms desire into hatred, but it returns in educational pursuits—a sublimated craving. In China’s middle class, public nationalism masks private aspiration, illustrating Freudian ambivalence on a societal scale. Who Wants to Be America is not merely interrogative—it’s affirmative, unveiled in the resolute selections of China’s affluent stratum.
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