Tentative steps toward a US-Russia rapprochement have been witnessed this year, largely driven by the Trump administration’s diplomatic initiatives amid the ongoing Ukraine war. Following Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2025, US foreign policy shifted toward prioritizing negotiations with Russia to end the conflict, culminating in a high-profile summit between Trump and Vladimir Putin in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15, 2025. This meeting, while failing to produce a concrete ceasefire agreement, symbolized a warming of relations, with both leaders emphasizing mutual respect and shared interests in stabilizing global security. Trump publicly aligned with Putin’s stance by downplaying the immediate need for a truce, instead advocating for a “permanent peace” that could involve Ukraine ceding territories under Russian control, such as parts of Donbas and Crimea. This pivot has been interpreted by analysts as a concession to Russian demands, allowing Putin to claim diplomatic victories without significant compromises.
Critics may characterize the Trump administration’s approach as a desperate effort to appease, recognize, flatter, and empower Vladimir Putin, pointing to Trump’s effusive praise for Putin during and after the summit, including remarks on a “red carpet” rollout and suggestions of arranging a direct Putin-Zelenskyy meeting. Trump has repeatedly signaled flexibility, such as backing plans for land-for-peace deals and delaying new sanctions on Russian energy exports, which some see as empowering Putin by easing economic pressures on Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has downplayed prospects for immediate talks, indicating Moscow’s leverage in negotiations, while Trump continues to push for progress, even suggesting Ukraine adopt an “offensive” posture to force concessions. This dynamic reflects Trump’s broader strategy to reset US-Russia ties, potentially at the expense of traditional alliances with Europe and Ukraine, as evidenced by his administration’s rhetoric framing Russia as a partner against other global threats like China. However, domestic US opposition and Russia’s unyielding demands—such as Ukraine’s neutrality and demilitarization—have stalled momentum, with no follow-up summit confirmed as of August 24, 2025.
Russia’s Drift Away from China
Parallel to this US outreach, signs of Russia drifting away from its close partnership with China have emerged in 2025, though the relationship remains robust in areas like trade and military cooperation. This potential divergence is multifaceted, encompassing geopolitical rivalries, shifting dependencies, and societal undercurrents, which could be amplified by improved US-Russia ties.
The North Korean Factor
A key indicator of this drift is the activation and deepening of the Russia-North Korea alliance, particularly in the context of Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. Ukraine’s surprise offensive in August 2024 seized significant territory in Kursk, prompting Russia to invoke its mutual defense treaty with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), signed in June 2024. By October 2024, North Korean troops were deployed to support Russian forces, helping recapture most of the lost ground by early 2025. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has publicly lauded these “heroic” troops, and Pyongyang has openly acknowledged its combat role, marking a shift from covert support to overt alliance activation. This includes not only military personnel but also plans to send construction workers and deminers for reconstruction in Kursk.
This development has reduced North Korea’s dependence on China, its traditional patron, as Russia provides alternative sources of economic aid, technology, and military backing. Historically, China wielded significant leverage over the DPRK through economic sanctions enforcement and aid, but with Russia stepping in—supplying ammunition, food, and even battlefield experience for North Korean forces—Beijing’s influence has waned. Analysts note that this triangulation weakens China’s regional dominance, as North Korea gains more autonomy to pursue aggressive policies without Beijing’s veto, potentially complicating China’s efforts to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula. In the broader context, Russia’s pivot to North Korea signals a diversification of alliances away from over-reliance on China, especially as Moscow seeks partners less constrained by US sanctions.
Standard Geopolitical Arguments
Geopolitically, Russia and China, as contiguous great powers with imperial ambitions, face inherent limitations in forming a genuine, long-term alliance. Their partnership is often described as one of convenience rather than deep trust, rooted in shared opposition to US hegemony but undermined by competing interests in regions like Central Asia, the Arctic, and the Indo-Pacific. Experts argue that as “non-aggressors with benefits,” their ties lack the ideological cohesion of Cold War blocs, with China viewing Russia as a junior partner economically and militarily. Divergent goals—such as Russia’s focus on Europe and China’s on Asia-Pacific dominance—create friction, with no formal military alliance due to Beijing’s reluctance to commit to mutual defense pacts that could entangle it in Russia’s conflicts.
In Central Asia, both nations vie for influence over energy resources and security, with China’s Belt and Road Initiative clashing with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union ambitions, potentially leading to a “rupture” in their friendship. Arctic cooperation has intensified, but underlying distrust persists, as Russia guards its territorial claims against Chinese expansion. US strategies aim to exploit these fissures, with some suggesting that rapprochement with Russia could “wedge” it away from China by offering economic incentives or reduced sanctions. While 2025 has seen continued public displays of unity, such as Xi-Putin summits affirming “no-limits” ties, underlying asymmetries—Russia’s economic vulnerability post-Ukraine war and China’s global rise—could accelerate a drift if US-Russia relations improve.
Micro-Level Factors: Ethnocentrism and Intrinsic Racism
At the societal level, tensions between Russians and Chinese are exacerbated by historical and contemporary attitudes, including elements of xenophobia and racism toward Asians. Russia has a documented history of racism, manifesting in negative attitudes and actions against non-ethnic Russian groups, including migrants from Asia. This racism has deep cultural roots, tracing back to the imperial era of the Romanov dynasty, where concepts of racial hierarchy influenced policies toward non-Slavic populations, including Asians. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, Russians often viewed Asians through the lens of the “Yellow Peril,” a widespread European fear of Asian demographic and economic expansion, which portrayed East Asians as an existential threat to white European civilization. This narrative was amplified in Russia due to its vast Asian territories and border conflicts, such as those with China over Manchuria, fostering stereotypes of Asians as inferior, cunning, or barbaric.
The Soviet Union officially promoted internationalism and anti-racism as part of its ideology, condemning racial discrimination and positioning itself against Western imperialism. However, in practice, underlying prejudices persisted, particularly toward Central Asians and other ethnic minorities within the USSR, who were often subjected to Russification policies that prioritized Slavic culture and language. Post-Soviet Russia saw a resurgence of overt racism in the 1990s and 2000s, fueled by economic instability, migration, and nationalist movements. This period witnessed violent attacks on ethnic minorities, including Asians, who were scapegoated for crime, job competition, and cultural dilution. Central Asians, in particular, have faced systemic discrimination, with incidents spiking after events like the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, leading to widespread beatings, vandalism, and racial profiling. Scholars note that while Soviet discourse denied racism’s existence, it masked a form of “colonial allergy” where Russians viewed non-European subjects as culturally backward, a legacy that continues to influence attitudes today.
Anti-Chinese sentiments, or “Sinophobia,” have been particularly pronounced in regions like the Russian Far East and Siberia, where fears of Chinese economic dominance and migration fuel resentment, often framed in racial terms. Russians frequently mention the proliferation of Chinese businesses along the border and throughout the Siberian region with a mixture of complaint and mockery, portraying it as an insidious “invasion” or “takeover.” For instance, local narratives complain about Chinese entrepreneurs dominating markets in agriculture, logging, and retail, accusing them of exploiting resources, undercutting local wages, and engaging in illegal land acquisitions—often with mocking references to Chinese work habits, crowded living conditions, or perceived cultural inferiority. This rhetoric echoes historical anxieties, such as claims that China might reclaim “lost” territories like Outer Manchuria, blending economic grievances with racial stereotypes of Chinese as opportunistic or swarm-like. Such views are amplified in online forums and media, where mockery includes well-known derogatory jokes about Chinese “colonization” of Siberia through business ventures, reinforcing a sense of Slavic victimhood against Asian encroachment. Surveys and reports highlight widespread xenophobia, with incidents of harassment, violence, and discrimination against Asian communities, including Chinese workers and students.
Influential figures like Alexander Dugin, a prominent Russian philosopher and geopolitical thinker often associated with Eurasianism, have contributed to these undercurrents through their views. While Dugin publicly rejects biological racism as a product of Western modernity and claims to advocate for multiculturalism within a Eurasian framework, it has been found that Dugin’s visions indeed promote a form of “cultural racism” or civilizational hierarchy that implicitly devalues non-Slavic or Asian influences. In his writings, such as “The Fourth Political Theory,” Dugin draws on elements from fascism and traditionalism but purportedly “decontaminates” them of racism; however, his emphasis on sacred geography and opposition to “Atlanticist” (Western) influences often portrays Asian civilizations—particularly China—as part of a multipolar alliance, yet subordinate to Russian spiritual leadership. Debates, such as his 2022 exchange with Bernard-Henri Lévy, have highlighted accusations of Dugin’s anti-Semitism and racism, with Lévy labeling his ideology as inherently discriminatory. Dugin’s esoteric views on race, including epistemological racism in postmodern contexts, provide a pseudo-intellectual basis for xenophobia, framing cultural differences in hierarchical terms that resonate with broader Russian nationalist sentiments toward Asians.
Implications and Outlook
A US-Russia rapprochement could accelerate Russia’s drift from China by offering Moscow alternative partnerships, reducing its isolation, and exploiting existing Sino-Russian tensions. However, this remains potential rather than realized, as Russia’s economy still relies heavily on Chinese trade (overtaking the EU as its top partner), and both nations share anti-Western goals. The North Korean alliance exemplifies how Russia is hedging its bets, while geopolitical and societal factors provide fertile ground for divergence. If Trump’s efforts yield tangible deals, such as a Ukraine settlement, it might empower Putin to pursue a more independent path, reshaping global alliances in unpredictable ways. Nonetheless, any drift would likely be gradual, given the mutual benefits of the current Sino-Russian axis.
Such a “Russian diplomatic revolution” in the present era would reflect a strategic pivot to reassert global influence through U.S. engagement, alternative alliances like North Korea, and countering Western isolation via BRICS and Global South partnerships. The time is ripe for re-integrating Russia into the global system, particularly through a U.S.-Russia rapprochement that could offer Moscow economic relief and diplomatic legitimacy, reducing its dependence on China. This shift could further isolate China geopolitically, as losing both North Korea and Russia as reliable partners would leave Beijing with little beyond Iran in the international political game. North Korea’s growing autonomy, bolstered by Russian support, weakens China’s regional leverage, while Russia’s drift—driven by geopolitical rivalries and societal tensions—could diminish Beijing’s influence in an age of systemic turbulence.
China’s coming isolation extends beyond diplomacy to cultural and racial dimensions, further entrenching its marginalization on the world stage. Diplomatically, China’s assertive policies, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and perceived economic coercion have strained relations with many countries, leaving it with few genuine allies beyond opportunistic partnerships. Culturally and racially, China faces persistent stereotypes and mistrust in Western and—perhaps all the more so—non-Western societies, where its global outreach (through initiatives like the Belt and Road) is often viewed with suspicion as neo-imperialism. Anti-Chinese sentiment, rooted in historical prejudices and recent events, has led to discrimination and hostility toward Chinese diaspora communities, further alienating China from global cultural integration. With Russia potentially realigning toward the West and North Korea gaining autonomy, China’s strategic and cultural isolation could deepen, positioning it as a lone actor reliant on Iran, a partnership limited by Tehran’s own pariah status and regional constraints.
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