China’s actions in Southeast Asia tell a story that sharply contrasts with the trite narrative of a nation seeking a stable, prosperous region to fuel its economic ambitions. Far from championing peace, Beijing is drawn to corrupt, unsteady governments, where it can extend its influence through secretive deals, quiet alliances, and calculated interventions. This approach thrives on a carefully managed level of disorder, challenging the idea that China’s primary goal is a calm neighborhood. Instead, it cultivates environments where weak regimes are pliable, allowing Beijing to secure its strategic interests—whether it’s trade routes, resource access, or geopolitical leverage—without the resistance that stronger, more accountable systems would present.
China’s recent moves in the region’s trouble spots reveal a pattern not of resolving crises but of keeping them simmering just enough to maintain control. By ensuring governments remain fragile yet functional, Beijing secures its influence without risking total collapse. This strategy allows China to advance its agenda in ways that would falter in nations with robust, transparent institutions. The delicate balance it strikes is deliberate: enough stability to keep its projects running smoothly, but enough instability to keep local leaders dependent on its support. This approach is evident in China’s handling of Myanmar and Cambodia, the two (only) countries where Chinese influence is pronounced, and it sheds light on why Beijing seems to thrive in environments of unaccountable governance and murky practices.
Consider Myanmar’s turbulent 1027 offensive in October 2023, a dramatic clash that laid bare China’s true priorities. Rebel groups, including the Three Brotherhood Alliance, launched a bold assault on the military junta that had seized power in a 2021 coup. The initial narrative suggested China supported the rebels to pressure the junta into cracking down on scam operations along Myanmar’s borders—cybercrime hubs and trafficking networks that had become a growing embarrassment for Beijing, especially as they targeted Chinese citizens. These operations, often run from lawless enclaves near the China-Myanmar border, had sparked domestic outrage in China, with stories of kidnapped citizens and fraudulent schemes making headlines. At first glance, China’s backing of the rebels seemed like a principled stand to protect its people. But the reality was far more calculated. When the junta teetered on the brink of collapse under the rebels’ momentum, China swiftly changed course, funneling weapons and support to prop up the regime. The supposed priority of combating crime took a backseat to a colder truth: Beijing needed the junta to survive to safeguard its strategic interests, including the vital China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a linchpin of the Belt and Road Initiative that grants China access to the Indian Ocean.
This pivot in Myanmar reveals a core truth about China’s foreign policy: it’s driven by pragmatism, not principle. The junta, despite its brutality and incompetence, is a reliable partner for Beijing precisely because it’s isolated and desperate. With few other allies, the regime depends on China’s economic and military support, making it a pliable tool for advancing Beijing’s goals. The scam centers, while a genuine concern, were ultimately a secondary issue—a convenient pretext to justify China’s initial support for the rebels while masking its deeper aim of maintaining control over Myanmar’s rulers. By keeping the junta in power, China ensures that Myanmar remains a strategic asset, incapable of aligning with rival powers like the United States or India. This episode underscores that China’s actions are less about promoting stability or protecting its citizens and more about perpetuating a state of controlled chaos that maximizes its influence over vulnerable governments.
Cambodia offers a parallel example, where China’s support for a flawed regime reveals similar priorities. As one of Beijing’s few diplomatic allies in Southeast Asia, Cambodia’s ruling Hun family has long relied on Chinese backing to maintain its grip on power. The 2025 Cambodia-Thailand conflict, a flare-up that caught many by surprise, has fueled speculation about China’s intentions. Alongside the cliché portraying the Chinese government as actually concerned about Chinese citizens being targeted by criminal organizations based in Cambodia (as well as Myanmar), there are also arguments that Beijing wants to distance itself from Cambodia’s leadership, which sustains itself through a shadowy economy of scams, illegal gambling, and other illicit activities. These ventures, much like Myanmar’s scam hubs, have drawn international scrutiny, with reports of forced labor and fraud tarnishing Cambodia’s reputation.
The narrative suggests that China, worried about the well-being of its citizens and embarrassed by its association with such a regime, might push for a leadership change to curb these criminal ties. But this interpretation doesn’t hold up under scrutiny. Cambodia’s rulers, like Myanmar’s junta, are too valuable to Beijing to be abandoned. Isolated from Western support due to their authoritarian practices and poor human rights record, the Hun family depends on China’s economic and diplomatic lifelines, making them a loyal partner in a region where Beijing’s influence is increasingly contested.
The Cambodia-Thailand conflict illustrates how China’s backing emboldens its allies to take bold, even reckless, actions. On the surface, Cambodia’s decision to provoke Thailand—a militarily and economically stronger neighbor—seems irrational. Thailand’s armed forces and economic clout dwarf Cambodia’s, and a direct confrontation risks escalation that Phnom Penh could ill afford. Yet, this move makes sense when viewed through the lens of China’s strategic calculus. Cambodia’s leaders know they have Beijing’s protection, a safety net that allows them to act with confidence, even in the face of a more formidable adversary. China cannot afford to lose Cambodia, one of its few reliable allies in Southeast Asia, especially as the United States, India, and other powers vie for influence in the region. By ensuring the Hun family’s survival, Beijing maintains a foothold that serves as a counterweight to its rivals, even if it means tolerating Cambodia’s rogue behavior and the regional tensions it sparks.
This pattern highlights a broader truth about China’s approach: its influence thrives in environments of weak governance, where accountability is scarce, and grey-zone practices—such as opaque loans, informal agreements, and elite co-optation—can flourish. Comparatively transparent, accountable systems, like those in Thailand or Singapore, are far less susceptible to the kind of backroom deals and shadowy investments that China excels at. In contrast, fragile states like Myanmar and Cambodia offer fertile ground for Beijing to cement its sway without facing significant scrutiny. By keeping these governments just stable enough to function, China ensures they remain dependent, unable to challenge its agenda or align with competing powers. This strategy is not about fostering prosperity or stability but about exploiting vulnerabilities to secure long-term advantages.
China’s approach in Southeast Asia has broader implications for the region’s stability and cohesion. By prioritizing weak, unaccountable allies over cooperative frameworks like ASEAN, Beijing undermines efforts to address shared challenges, from economic inequality to climate change. The Cambodia-Thailand conflict, for instance, strains bilateral ties and complicates ASEAN’s ability to present a united front. Countries like Thailand, which balance ties with the West and regional neighbors, find themselves navigating a fractured landscape shaped by China’s influence. This fragmentation serves Beijing’s interests, as it prefers bilateral deals with vulnerable states over multilateral engagements that might dilute its leverage.
The broader geopolitical context adds another layer to China’s strategy. Southeast Asia is a critical theater in the global contest between China and powers like the United States, India, and Japan, all of whom seek to counter Beijing’s growing influence. By cultivating relationships with weak regimes, China creates a sphere of influence that challenges Western dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Myanmar and Cambodia, though small, are strategic assets—Myanmar for its access to the Indian Ocean, Cambodia for its position in the South China Sea and its role as a loyal ally in ASEAN. By ensuring these governments remain dependent, China secures leverage in a region where its rivals are actively courting partners.
As a result, China’s strategy in Southeast Asia hinges on exploiting governance gaps to secure its foothold. By aligning with regimes like Myanmar ‘s junta and Cambodia’s Hun family, Beijing ensures a network of loyal partners who ultimately depend on its support. This approach allows China to advance its economic and strategic goals—whether it’s securing trade routes, accessing resources, or other forms of infiltration—without the constraints of transparent systems.
Importantly, the notion that China prioritizes protecting its citizens from international organized crime, such as the scam centers flourishing in Cambodia and Myanmar, crumbles under closer examination. While Beijing often cites these criminal networks as a driver of its foreign policy, its actions reveal a different priority: perpetuating weak, unaccountable governments that serve its strategic interests. In both Myanmar and Cambodia, China’s public stance against scams—highlighted by diplomatic pressure and occasional crackdowns—appears more performative than genuine. In Myanmar, Beijing’s initial support for the 1027 offensive gave way to propping up the junta when collapse loomed, showing that controlling a pliable regime trumped addressing crime. Similarly, in Cambodia, China’s calls for action against scam compounds target smaller operations while shielding larger ones tied to elites, preserving the Hun family’s rule. This selective enforcement serves as a smokescreen, allowing Beijing to maintain its influence over governments that rely on its support to survive.
Transparent, accountable systems would demand stricter oversight, exposing China’s opaque deals and limiting its leverage. By contrast, weak regimes, mired in corruption, enable Beijing to operate unchecked, prioritizing long-term geopolitical gains over the immediate welfare of its citizens caught in these criminal webs.
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